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BOUNCING

THE

TIGHTROPE:

THE

S.E.C.

ATTACKS SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE, BUT
PROVIDES LITTLE STABILITY FOR ANALYSTS
J. Scott Colesanti, LL.M."
INTRODUCTION
Indisputably, discussions between corporate officers and financial
analysts are fraught with peril, and the confrontation itself has been
popularized as "a fencing match conducted on a tightrope."' At the less
glamorous end of that tightrope is the analyst. Expected to draw "oohs" and
"ahs," yet unforgiven for stumbling, he walks the wire above the abyss of Rule

1Ob-5 ("10b-5")2 litigation every time he creates a report, relays an

announcement, or simply makes a recommendation after meeting with

management.3
With new insider trading schemes catapulting that crime back onto page
one of the newspapers, and regulators and laymen alike fearing its unknown
proportions, 4 the Securities and Exchange Commission ("S.E.C." or
"Commission") on December 20, 1999 released for comment a series of
proposed new rules ("Proposal").' The rule with the most immediate impact

*

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

The author is an Adjunct Professor of Securities Regulation at Saint Louis University School of Law.
He has served an appointment to the Corporate Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, and was an attorney with the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. for over 10 years.
All views expressed herein are purely personal.
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977)) ("Bausch & Lomb").
17 C.F.R. § 240. 1Ob-5 (1999) (promulgated pursuant to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1994)) ("Exchange Act").
This article does not address the unsympathetic circumstances surrounding the analyst who, after
obtaining a private audience with corporate management, uses the disclosed information to trade for
her own benefit. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See, Thor Valdmanis & Tom Lowry, Wall Street'sNewBreed Revives Inside Trading,USA ToDAY,
Nov. 4, 1999, at IB, availablein 1999 WL 6857615.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590 (1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 230,240,243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999). Two of the proposed rules, Rule l05-I and
Rule 10b5-2 address, respectively, the unsettled issues in inside information cases of(a) whether the
S.E.C. must prove that a defendant charged with violating lob-5 "used" (as opposed to simply
proving he was in "knowingpossession"of) inside information and (b) "what types of family or other
non-business relationships" can form the basis for liability "under the misappropriation theory of
insider trading." Id. at 72,591 (emphasis added). The proposed new concept of lobS-I, that a
defendant is liable if trading while aware of material nonpublic information, would hopefully end
the "use" versus "possession" debate. See, Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, Insider Trading:
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was Regulation FD (i.e., "Fair Disclosure"), which mandated that an issuer
quickly act to broadly disseminate comments made, either intentionally or
inadvertently, to a small audience (i.e., during a teleconference, private
interview, or informal meeting)." After much controversy and debate,
Regulation FD was formally adopted by the Commission on August 10 th of
2000 and became effective on October 23rd.7
Citing various recent studies setting forth the baleful effects of"selective
disclosure,"' the S.E.C. outright declared war on the process. However, a
necessary casualty of that war is the financial analyst. Indeed, a diminished
role in the new Millennium is anticipated for Wall Street's economists, as is
bluntly stated in (1) the Proposal ("[a]lthough analysts play an important role
in gathering and analyzing information, and disseminating their analysis to
investors, we do not believe that allowing issuers to disclose material
information selectively to analysts is in the best interests of investors or the
securities markets generally."),9 and (2) the Final Release ("Whereas issuers
once may have had to rely on analysts to serve as information intermediaries,
issuers can0 now use a variety of methods to communicate directly with the
market.")
Within a month of its release of the Proposal, the S.E.C. received scores
of supportive comments from both individuals and institutional investors
alike." Focusing on Regulation FD's remedial spirit, these comments ranged
from the polite and appreciative ("I applaud your efforts to level the playing
field ... .,,)2 to the frustrated and plaintive ("Do your job! ... Give hard-

'Use v. Possession,' 220 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1998).

As for proposed rule 10b5-2, it relates to the

"misappropriation theory" used by the S.E.C. to prosecute "outsiders" (i.e., traders who are not

6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
1I.

12.

employees or directors) since the early 1980s. The theory was officially upheld by the Supreme
Court for the first time in 1997. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (partner in law firm
convicted of violating, inter alia, Rule lOb-5 for trading in the stocks and options of a company to
be acquired by his law firm's client).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240, 243, and 249) ("Final Release").
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591-92. For purposes of this article,
"selective disclosure" is defined as any disclosure of material news by an issuer to a group smaller
than the general public.
Id. at 72,591.
Final Release at 51,717.
A copy of the Comments to the Proposed Rule on Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading can be
found at <http://www.sec.gov/rules/s73199.htm>. The authors of comments on Regulations FD
submitted to the S.E.C., either supportive or critical, are referred to herein generally as

"Commentators."
Jan.
Comments
of Tom Winberry,
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/s73199/winberr I.txt>.

24,

2000,

available

at
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working people who get their money by 'earning it' an even break with the

fixers of Wall Street."). 3 But these comments ignored the fact that the courts,
as well as the S.E.C., have consistently endorsed the beneficial "screening"
role of analysts.' Moreover, lacking much guidance in the area of selective
disclosure, these same courts often frustrate the cause of disclosure by

indirectly chilling corporate discussions in refusing to dismiss professionals
such as analysts and corporate officials from ubiquitous civil 1Ob-5 actions."
S.E.C. Chairman Arthur Levitt was passionate about outlawing selective
disclosure, which he publicly labeled a "stain upon our market."' 6 Indeed, the
Chairman's shotgun approach to eliminating the practice alternatively decried
analysts' alleged lack ofdisclosure "about their firms' close relationships with
the companies they follow,"' 7 their unique status as recipients of material
information,' and their allegedly biased and inaccurate analysis.' 9
Accordingly, after extending the comment period and receiving nearly 6,000

13.

14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

at
2000,
available
Jan.
24,
of
P.
Mattingly,
Comments
<http:lwww.sec.govlruless73199/matting1.txt>.In a similar vein are the comments submitted the
same day by Glenn M. Welt, "1 private investor": "Small investors are being left in the dark till the
A copy of these comments can be found at
big boys make their moves."
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/s73199/welt.txt>. Conversely, the Securities Industry Association
("SIA") has formally filed with the Commission, its opposition to Regulation FD on various grounds,
including the proposed regulation's chilling effect on corporate disclosure, its possible abridgment
of First Amendment rights, and its eradication of the necessary function of analysts to"screen, distill,
and evaluate 'raw' information." See, Comment Letter from Stuart J. Kaswell, SIA Senior Vice
President and General Counsel, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, S.E.C. (Feb. 24,2000), reprintedat
<http://www.sia.com/legal-regulatory/html/proposed-regulation.html> (visited Apr. 1, 2000). On
March 22, 2000, the S.E.C. extended the comment period on Regulation FD until April 28, 2000.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 16,160 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249). See also, Lynn Hume, Johnson Leaving S.E.C.; Extra Time for
DisclosureFeedback, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 23, 2000, at 6.
See infra notes 127 and 138.
Approximately 755 securities class actions were filed between 1996 and 1999. Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, Stanford University School of Law website (visited Feb. 21, 2000)
<http://www.securities.stanford.edu/statshtm>. Approximately 90 cases alleging fraud under the
Exchange Act were filed between October 1999 and February 2000 alone. Search of LEXIS, Docket
Library, USCIVL File (Feb. 23, 2000).
Floyd Norris, Wall Street Snarls at S.E.C. Proposal on Disclosure, THE NEW YORK TiMEs, Dec. 16,
1999, at Cl, available in 1999 WL 31760050.
Gretchen Morgenson, Less Than Full Disclosure, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at C I,
available in 1999 WL 31765856.
Norris, supranote 17, atC1.
Final Release at 51,717 (arguing that "analysts predominantly issue 'buy' recommendations on
covered issuers").
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comments,2° the S.E.C., by a vote of 3 - 1, adopted Regulation FD on August
10, 2000.21
To be sure, the "feel good" Regulation FD comes at a time when insider
trading appears to be once again hiding its ugly head, and phrased as a cure for
corporate favoritism among investors, it seems very hard to oppose.22 But, as
a hybrid of rulemaking and adoption of existing caselaw that avoids defining
key terms and sets up strict, new, corporate obligations, has it simply created
fear, confusion, and even worse, yet more 1Ob-5 caselaw? Moreover, does it
hearken a return to the era when the analyst was held by the S.E.C. to what
was tantamount to a strict liability standard simply for being too much "in the
loop" of corporate communications?
Part I of this article summarizes Regulation FD. Part II summarizes the
"traditional" treatment accorded analysts by the S.E.C., private 1Ob-5
plaintiffs, and the courts, and describes two efforts in the 1990s by the
Supreme Court and the Congress to remove analysts and similar ancillary
players from the ever-burgeoning 1Ob-5 caseload. Part III provides a
background for an evaluation of the analyst's role by discussing his duties in
corporate disclosure settings and the accolades consistently received therefor.
Part IV discusses the possible flaws in Regulation FD while encouraging the
S.E.C. to complete the more arduous, but surely more direct, approach of
defining materiality.

I. REGULATION FD
A. Background
Inthe Proposal, the S.E.C. acknowledged that the media attention given
to selective disclosure had turned its head, stating that:
Many recent cases of selective disclosure have ben reported in the media. In

some cases, selective disclosures have been made in conference calls or
meetings that are open only to analysts and/or institutional investors, and
20.

Aaron Luchetti & Christopher Oster, Janus Worries That S.E.C. Plan WillLimitAccess, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 9, 2000, at CI, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3039511.

21.

22.

In a rare, non-unanimous vote, Commissioner Laura Unger voted against adoption of the regulation,
stating that she feared it "casts too wide a net." Danny Hakim, S.E.C. ApprovesRegulation Against
Selective Disclosure; Small Investors to Benefit, Chairman Says, THE NEW YORK TIMms, Aug. 11,
2000, at C7.
It was the famous Dean and Professor Henry G. Manne who wrote, "After all, who can be against full
disclosure? The very suggestion smacks of condoning fraud, lying and deceit." Henry 0. Manne,
Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 569 (1970).
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5

exclude other investors, members of the public, and the media.
Commonly, these situations involve advance notice of the issuer's upcoming
quarterly earnings or sales figures-figures which, when announced, have a
predictable and significant impact on the market price of the issuer's
securities.23
Thus, heeding the persistent call of critics,24 the S.E.C. unequivocally
targeted selective disclosure, stating that the common practice posed "a

serious threat to investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
securities markets."25 The Proposal also relied on a 1998 study by the
National Investor Relations Institute, which disclosed that 26 %of responding
companies "stated that they engage in some type of selective disclosure
practices."2' 6 Indeed, the Proposal noted that despite applicable rules of selfregulatory organizations (i.e., the NYSE, the NASD) that require prompt
disclosure of material developments by listed companies, "issuers retain some
control over the precise timing of many important corporate disclosures" as
well as over the "audience and forum for some important disclosures."27 The
rule sought to effectively outlaw an industry practice that, while traditional,
had at times drawn harsh criticism from commentators advocating a
theoretical "level playing field" of informational parity for all investors.28
The Final Release, too, relied heavily on a study by the National Investor
Relations Institute study, this time for the argument that studies on improved
corporate disclosure are not conclusive.29 Making some modifications but
staying true to the spirit of the Proposal, the Commission doubled the length

of Regulation FD but refused to significantly tone down its breadth or tenor.3

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591-92 (1999) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240,243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, 218 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1997).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592.
Id. at 72,591-92 n.ll.
Id.at 72,591.
Coffee, supra note 24, at 5.
The study concluded that "most" issuers were already opening their conference calls to analysts, thus
lessening the need for Regulation FD. Final Release at 51,717-18 (citing NIRI Executive Alert,
Most Corporate Conference Calls Are Now Open to Individual Investors and the Media, Feb. 29,

30.

2000).
The seven modifications incorporated into the final version of Regulation FD were: (I) the removal
of foreign issuers from its application; (2) narrowing its scope from "all communications" to those
communications made to four enumerated groups; (3)narrowing the issuer personnel covered by the
regulation to "senior officials" and those persons who regularly communicate with securities
professionals or shareholders; (4) expressly providing that the regulation does not create duties under
Rule I Ob-5; (5)providing that an issuer's violation does not preclude the issuer from utilizing short
form registration or security holders from reselling under Rule 144; (6) excluding communications
made in connection with registered securities offerings; and (7) clarifying that violations require
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Most notably, the Commission sought to narrow the scope of Regulation FD
while alleviating fears of spurring class actions against issuers.
B. What It Requires
Regulation FD, a self-coined "new issuer disclosure rule,"'" does not
mandate that issuers disclose all material developments, requiring instead
"that when an issuer chooses to disclose material nonpublic information, it
must do so broadly to the investing public, not selectively to a favored few."32
Rule 100 of Regulation FD33 sets out the basics. Whenever an issuer or any
person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to any
ofthe four enumerated groups of individuals, the issuer must "simultaneously"
(for intentional disclosures) or "promptly" (for non-intentional disclosures)
make public disclosure of that same information.34 For intentional disclosures,
"simultaneously" is not defined. For non-intentional disclosures, "promptly"
is defined to mean "as soon as reasonably practicable" but in no case longer
than twenty-four hours.3"
Once triggered, the issuer's "public disclosure" requirement can be met
by several means. The Proposal had stated that the preferred manner of
complying with public disclosure would be the filing of a Form 8-K with the
Commission. 6 The Final Release loosened the requirement to include the
filing37 of a Form 8-K or alternative measures that could include the
dissemination of a press release in conjunction with the holding of a public
press conference (with notice), or any method/combination of methods
"reasonably calculated to make effective, broad and non-exclusionary public

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.

knowing (or recklessly not knowing) that disclosed information is both material and nonpublic.
Id at 51,718-19 (emphasis added).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,591. Regulation FD is actually a
collection of four rules, numbered consecutively from 100 through 103.
Id.
at 72,594.
The complete text of proposed Regulation FD is attached as Appendix 1.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594.
Id.at 72,596. An additional late modification by the Commission grants the non-intentionally
disclosing issuer until the later of 24 hours or the next trading day's opening on the NYSE. Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,722-23 (2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 240,243, and 249).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,596.
Further, issuers are granted the option of"furnishing" a Form 8-K (i.e., including a report under the
form's Item 9) or "filing" a Form 8-K (i.e., completing a report under Item 5). Final Release at
51,723.
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disclosure, given the particular circumstances" of the issuer. 8 Expressly not
satisfactory is simply posting information on a website, absent other actions.39
C. Whom It Applies To
Regulation FD would apply to virtually all reporting companies.4 It
prohibits selective disclosures made by a "person acting on behalf of an
issuer" (e.g., "any senior official of the issuer" or "any other officer,
employee, or agent of an issuer who regularly communicates" with industry
professionals)4' to any of four enumerated classes.42 Those four classes are
essentially "securities market professionals" (i.e., broker-dealers, investment
companies, and investment advisors) and shareholders "under circumstances
in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such person would purchase or sell
securities on the basis of the information.' ' 3 At the behest of Commentators
from the media, "ordinary-course business communications" (i.e., routine
discussions with the press) were effectively exempted in the final version
through the addition of the more specific provisions governing covered issuer
personnel and information recipients."
"Senior official" is defined as "any director, executive, officer, investor
relations or public relations officer, or other person with similar functions. '
Disclosures made at the direction of a senior official are imputed to that
official, but a person who communicates material, nonpublic information in
breach of a duty to the issuer "would not be considered to be acting on behalf
of the issuer."
Beyond the fabled closed-door meeting between management and
analysts, Regulation FD would apply to a variety of situations in which
selective disclosure may take place. Examples given are conference calls with

38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
at 51,724.
Id.
Id.at 5 1,723-24. The Proposal estimated that each of the approximately 14,000 domestic issuers
currently subject to reporting requirements submits, on average, two Forms 8-K to the Commission
each year, at a production cost of approximately $475 per filing. The Proposal further estimated that
the total number of Form 8K filings would increase to approximately 70,000 per year as issuers
complied with Regulation FD. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,606.
The Final Release reiterated the S.E.C.'s support for its estimate of five additional Forms 8-K per
year, per issuer under Regulation FD. Final Release at 51,731-32.
Id at 51,739.
Id. 51,719.
Id. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1) (1999)) ("Rule 100(b)(1)").
Id.
at 51,720 (referencing Rule 100(b)(1)).
Id at 51,720 n.34 (referencing 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(f) (1999)) ("Rule 101(0").
Id.
at 51,720.
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investors or analysts47 and situations where any "material information" is
communicated, verbally or in writing.4 The regulation expressly does not
apply to an issuer in registration, but it does apply to any private placement
where there is no confidentiality agreement in place 9 . Three other exclusions
remove from coverage disclosures to "temporary insiders" (e.g., an issuer's
attorney or an accountant), any person who expressly agrees to maintain the
disclosed information in confidence, and entities whose primary business is
the issuance of credit ratings (as long as the ratings are publicly available)."0
Stating that the Commission was "mindful" of Regulation FD's "chilling"
effect upon disclosure, the S.E.C. pointed out that any violations based upon
intentional disclosures would require scienter or at least recklessness as a
mental state in order to invite disciplinary action."' Likewise, the Commission
added that the regulation "would not provide a basis for private liability." 2
D. Generally
Although aimed at what is described as a current practice, in many ways
Regulation FD represents a summary of, and governmental reaction to, antifraud actions in the past. To that end, the Proposal traced some of the history
leading up to the present state of lOb-5 prosecutions of selective disclosure
of material information and also discussed some of the treatment that financial
analysts have historically received under IOb-5 in the past.53 As for the era
in which people like Raymond Dirks and the unfortunate analysts in Bausch
andLomb54 were seemingly charged for possessing inside information while
making recommendations, the Proposal made short shrift of the S.E.C.'s
earlier aggressive stance, concluding that "[a]fter Dirks, there have been very

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,591-92 (1999) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
Id. at 72,599.
Final Release at 51,719-20.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading at 72,720.
Final Release at 51,718. While recklessness asamental state foraRule lOb-5 violation has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court, the majority of the circuit courts have held that recklessness is
sufficient to state a claim. See, In re Wells Fargo Sees. Litig., 12 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1993); Breard
v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); and Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 893 F.2d
1405 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593-94.
See infra pp. 13-14.
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few insider trading cases based on disclosure to, or trading by, securities
analysts." '
Despite being "designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of
'
information by issuers"56
and avowing its opposition to the selective
disclosure of material, nonpublic information, both the Proposal and the Final
Release lacked specifics on the contours of such information. Indeed, neither
Regulation FD nor the Proposal's accompanying comments and explanation
("Comments") nor the Final Release define materialor nonpublic. Instead,

the Comments adopt the time-honored standard for "materiality" set forth in
TSCIndus. v. Northway, Inc." The Final Release reiterated the Commission's
support for TSC Industries while offering as examples, a handful of events
likely to be deemed material (e.g., mergers, bankruptcies, and a change in

auditors)."8
Similarly, as guidance for discerning what is nonpublic, the Comments
offered a citation to the flexible standard set by caselaw,59 which requires
"recognized channels ofdistribution" and offers public investors "a reasonable
waiting period to react to the information."'
The Final Release, while
suggesting a model combination of various methods by which news could be
made public,6 does not otherwise define nonpublic.
On several key points, the Proposal and the Final Release defer to civil
cases brought by private plaintiffs.62 As to the toughest question posed by
selective disclosure (i.e., what is the content of an improper disclosure?), the
S.E.C. stated the following:

55.

56.
57.

58.
59.

60.
61.

62.

Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593. The Proposal also admits: "Under
early insider trading case law, which appeared to require that traders have equal access to corporate
information, selective disclosure of material information to securities analysts could lead to liability.
This changed with the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella v. UnitedStates and Dirks v. SE.C."
Id.
Id at 72,590.
Id at 72,594. Specifically, a fact is material if "there is a substantial likelihood" that a reasonable
investor "would consider it important," or stated otherwise, if it would alter the "total mix of
information" available to the investor. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715, 51,721 (2000) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249).
Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,595. See, S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968); In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Release No. 34-9267,
44 S.E.C. 633 (July 29, 1971).
In the Matter of Certain Trading in the Common Stock of Faberge, Inc., Release No. 34-10174, 45
S.E.C. 249, 255 (May 25, 1973).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,724. For example, an issuer could (I)
issue a press release; (2) provide notice of an accompanying conference call; and (3) make said
conference call accessible by telephone or the Internet.
See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594 n.36.
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Although materiality issues do not lend themselves to a bright-line test, we
believe that the majority of cases are reasonably clear. At one end of the
spectrum, we believe issuers should avoid giving guidance or express
warnings to analysts or selected investors about important upcoming earnings
or sales figures; such earnings or sales figures will frequently have a
significant impact on the issuer's stock price. At the other end of the
spectrum, more generalized background information is less likely to be
material.63
Likewise, the Final Release refers the reader to the Supreme Court's ruling in
Basic,Inc. v. Levinson" for an elaboration on the flexible materiality standard
invoked by Regulation FD."'
In sum, the S.E.C., in broad strokes, proposed to allow issuers and others
a means of avoiding enforcement action (and perhaps, civil liability) by
quickly reporting to all what was said to the few. Regulation FD establishes
an amnesty, if you will, earned through an immediate rectifying of the
situation. The S.E.C. fielded objections to the scope of and vagaries in
Regulation FD until the end of April, and then announced in early August that
the proposal would be brought to a vote on August 10'. The press was quick
to focus on the public's widespread support for, and benefits from, the
regulation."
As for analysts, there is no similar benefit nor consideration. The
Proposal, Comments, and Final Release contain no guidelines for analysts
who find themselves in receipt of selectively disclosed information but do
include plenty of warnings about 1Ob-5 liability:
Rule 102 [of Regulation FD] is designed to exclude Rule 1Ob-5 liability for
cases that would be based "solely" on a failure to make a public disclosure
required by Regulation FD. As such, it does not affect any existing grounds
for liability under Rule lOb-5. Thus, for example, liability for "tipping" and
insider trading under Rule IOb-5 may still exist if a selective disclosure is
made in circumstances that meet the Dirks "personal benefit" test. 7 In
addition, an issuer's failure to make a public disclosure still may give rise to
liability under a "duty to correct" or "duty to update" theory in certain
circumstances. And an issuer's contacts with analysts may lead to liability
under the "entanglement" or "adoption" theories. In addition, if an issuer's
report or public disclosure made under Regulation FD contained false or

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 72,595.
485 U.S. 224(1988).
Final Release at 51,721 n.38.
Hakim, supra note 21, at C7.
See infra pp. 14-16.
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misleading information, or omitted material information, Rule 102 would not
provide protection from Rule 1Ob-5 liability. Finally, if an issuer failed to
comply with Regulation FD, it would be subject to an SEC enforcement
action alleging violations of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act (or,
in the case of a closed-end investment company, Section 30 of the
Investment Company Act) and Regulation FD. We could bring an
administrative action seeking a cease-and-desist order, or a civil action
seeking an injunction and/or civil money penalties. In appropriate cases, we
could also bring an enforcement action against an individual at the issuer
responsible for the violation, either as "a cause of" the violation in a
cease-and-desist proceeding, or as an aider and abetter of the violation in an
injunctive action.68
Despite this litany of disciplinary possibilities flowing from the new
regulation, the S.E.C. seeks elsewhere in the Final Release to clarify that
Regulation FD is not "an antifraud rule." 69 Additionally, the Final Release
specifically warns that"[i]fthe issuer official communicates selectively to the
analyst nonpublic information that the company's anticipated earnings will be
higher than, lower than, or even the same as what analysts have been
forecasting, the issuer will have likely violated Regulation FD." Alarmingly,
in concomitantly enacting Rule 10b5-1, " the Final Release also established
liability for trading "while 'aware' of material nonpublic information, 7 2 a
standard that sounds a lot like the "parity of information" theory" from the
1970s. In that decade, until checked by the courts, the S.E.C. often lumped
all violators and their assistants together, and, depending on the case, the
courts either agreed, disagreed, or put up new "STOP" signs. As is manifestly
clear, the S.E.C. was less than forgiving towards analysts who had failed to
divine the Commission's own signs.
II. THE 1970s: NO FREE LOVE FROM THE S.E.C.
Throughout the 1970s, the S.E.C. actively pursued analysts it felt had used
' of corporate communications to their personal
the "fencing match"74

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Final Release at 51,726.
Id.
Id.at51,721.
Rule IObS-I, in relevant part, is included as Appendix 2.
Final Release at 51,727-29 (emphasis added).
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (1999) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8,9 (2d Cir. 1977).
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advantage. Arguably, the "total mix" standard of TSC Industries'5 was often
deemed subordinate by the Commission to considerations of the exclusivity
of the source information. For example, amidst incontrovertible evidence of
prolonged falling stock prices, an analyst was charged for recommending the
sale of the remainder of his firm's inventory when it seemed that such action
was motivated by private disclosures from company management.7 6
Overall, analysts were fair game for S.E.C. actions, often prosecuted
under doctrines resembling or outright constituting the "parity of
information" theory." In one broad case, no less than fifteen different
investment advisers were charged with violating 1Ob-5 for recommending
and/or effecting sales of stock in Douglas Aircraft Co., Inc. after discussions

with company management or its underwriters disclosed anticipated reports
of lower earnings.7 Twelve of these parties were censured.79 On appeal, the

S.E.C. upheld the censures, summarily reasoning the trading to be violative
because the information underlying it was not generally known:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public
corporate information, which he has reason to know emanates from a
corporate source, and which by itself places him in a position superior to
other investors, thereby acquires a relationship with respect to that
information, within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provision [of
the Securities Acts]. °
But while the S.E.C.'s pursuit of this case, Investors Management Co.,
Inc., may frighten an analyst, its actions in Bausch & Lomb should send him
scurrying under the bed. In that case, the S.E.C. charged issuer and analyst

alike for negative trading recommendations that transpired during a welldocumented "bear market" in the lens maker's stock due to documented

75.
76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Lum's Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (analyst/stockbroker charged
with recommending that his institution sell its remaining block of 83,000 shares within
approximately one month of liquidating 42,000 shares of the same stock). The court acknowledged
that there was "apparently general knowledge" of the relevant industry's "riskiness" and "growing
at 1059 n.1.The court also took the occasion to note
difficulties" at the time of the second sale. Id.
the traditional, strict definition of an "illegal tip," (i.e., S.E.C. v. Texas GulfSulphur had focused on
the simple comment to a tippee that a company was "a good buy"). Id.at 1059.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593.
In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-1680, 1970 S.E.C. LEXIS
3042 (June 26, 1970) ("Investors Management").
Id. at *129.
In the Matter of Investors Mgmt. Co., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-1680,1971 S.E.C. LEXIS 962,
at *24 (July 29, 1971).

2000]

Bouncing the Tightrope

factors including, among other things, pressure from rivals, a delay in product
shipments, and growing questions about the safety of soft lenses."'
A. The Bausch & Lomb Nightmare
The S.E.C. alleged illegal "tipping" during a series of March, 1972
meetings between the CEO and analysts who covered Bausch & Lomb, Inc.
at a time when the company's fortunes were changing after a period of growth
occasioned by its breakthrough in the area of soft contact lenses. s2 The
S.E.C.'s program ran aground, however, as a district court judge from the
Southern District of New York denied the S.E.C.'s application for a
permanent injunction seeking to prohibit Bausch & Lomb, Inc. and its CEO
from further violations of 1Ob-5. s3 Noting that the CEO did not trade for his
own benefit, the district court held that there was a lack of scienter, and
further reminded that:
The permissible scope of corporate communication with security analysts has
yet to be authoritatively defined. As noted by this Court at the conclusion of
trial, injunctions as extraordinary remedies, should be issued when they are
needed in extraordinary situations and should not be utilized generally in lieu
of administrative regulations."
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's denial of the
injunction, s" noting, inter alia, that it did not accept the S.E.C.'s "facile
inference" that all evidence imparted by the CEO must have been material
because the stock dropped over eleven points the day after one of the March
meetings.8 6 The court placed the S.E.C.'s accusations in the context of a
forty-point stock drop in the three weeks before the meetings and reiterated
the district court's findings that the CEO was "a sincere and honest man, who,
out of an excessive zeal for fairness and accuracy... allowed material inside
information to 'pop out."'8 7 Noteworthy is the fact that, before the S.E.C.'s
allegations were shot down by the courts, two of the analysts charged for
recommending to their firm the liquidation of its Bausch & Lomb position
after these March meetings consented to judgments enjoining them from

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Id.
at 1234-38.
Id. at 1246.
1d.at 1245.
S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18-19.
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future violations of federal antifraud provisions."8 Thus, ironically, the
inequitable result followed that analysts were disciplined even though their
"tippers" were not. However, a subsequent Supreme Court holding 9 brought
more attention to the weaknesses in the S.E.C.'s 1Ob-5 theories.
B. The Dirks Correction
The story of Raymond Dirks is by now legendary within 1Ob-5 caselaw.
The facts transpired during roughly a three week period in March 1973.9
After Ronald Secrist ("Secrist"), a former employee of the publicly-traded
Equity Funding Corporation of America ("Equity"), alerted Dirks to possible
massive fraud at the insurance company, Dirks attempted to get The Wall
StreetJournaltopublish an article. 9' He also conducted his own investigation
by interviewing present and former Equity employees.' During this process,
Dirks spoke with analysts and others about his meeting with Secrist and, at
various times, advised his clients to sell their Equity holdings.93 Ultimately,
Dirks was interviewed by the S.E.C. and told them what he knew about the
alleged scandal.94 The S.E.C.'s Division of Enforcement charged Dirks with
aiding and abetting lOb-5 violations by passing Secrist's "tip" onto his
clients.9" Five investment analysts contacted by Dirks during these events
were also charged by the S.E.C. and received the penalty of censure.96
An administrative law judge found Dirks guilty and suspended him for
sixty days.97 On appeal, the Commission noted that, despite their "utility,"
analysts "have no special license to ignore the insider trading proscriptions of
'
the federal securities laws."98
Admitting that there exists a "generally
permissible" research advantage, Commissioners nonetheless concluded that:
[B]ecause of the nature of their activities, analysts must be alert to the line
between proper-even laudatory-analytical. efforts and unlawful tipping.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Release No. 6979, 1975 S.E.C. LEXIS 1227, at *I(S.D.N.Y. July
11, 1975) (notice of consent to issuance of final injunction).
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id.
Id.
at649.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 670.
In the Matter of Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Release No. 17480, 1981 S.E.C. LEXIS 2213, at *I
(June 22, 1981) (citing to the initial S.E.C. proceeding below).
Id. at *35.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *18.
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Where 'tippees'-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into
possession of material 'corporate information that they know is confidential
and know or should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either
publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading."
Eventually, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Dirks owed no duty
to Equity shareholders, either directly or derivatively."° The Court clarified
that a duty to disclose does not arise simply "from one's ability to acquire
information because of his position in the market."' 0 ' Dirks, therefore, could
not be guilty as a primary violator under 1Ob-5.0 2 To the same end, Dirks, as
the "tippee," had no duty to disclose or abstain from use of the inside
information obtained derivatively from the corporate insider (Secrist) because
Secrist, having gained no benefit from his "tip," could not be a "tipper."' 3
Thus, the Supreme Court expressly considered and rejected the notion that
the mere possession of material nonpublic information, absent a duty to
shareholders, could create the obligation to disclose or abstain.'" It was this
halting by the Supreme Court of the S.E.C.'s liberal application of the "parity
of information" theory0" that perhaps most contributed to the development of
the "misappropriation theory" under 10b-5, "ewhich focuses on a deceptive
manner of obtaining nonpublic information instead of any uniqueness of
position.
On another occasion in the 1970s, the S.E.C. sought to impose upon
analysts a duty to verify whether information obtained was public; however,
this theory was rejected by the court in S.E.C. v. Monarch Fund.0 7 In that
case, the Second Circuit summarily concluded that carrying such a theory "to
its logical conclusion" would mean that all investment advisers "who are
attracted to a particular security.., and seek to obtain further information
08
about it act at their peril."'

99.
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Id.at $19 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980)). However, the
Commission reduced Dirks' sanction from a suspension to a censure, noting his assistance in the
subsequent investigation of Equity and his previously unblemished tenure in the securities industry.
Id. at *35.
Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983).
Id.at 658 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)).
Id at 665.
Id.at 659-61, 667.
Id.at 653-54.
See, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,593 (1999) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
See id.at 72,602.
S.E.C. v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id.at 943.
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Against this very aggressive and somewhat indefensible past, the S.E.C.
sought, through the Proposal, to make amends for its prior treatment of
analysts and promise a more temperate future. But, notably, the Commission
did not wed itself to guidelines for dealing with advisers or analysts who
obtain questionable information. Commentators would agree that, post-Dirks,
the S.E.C. has demonstrably cooled its jets in terms of charging analysts. But
no Supreme Court holding or other limitation precludes the Commission from
charging analysts with, among other things, "aiding and abetting" 10b-5
violations. Further, Regulation FD inevitably invites private litigation and, as
that remedy has grown exponentially, analysts have remained a favorite target
of plaintiffs' attorneys. In this particular sea of litigation, neither actions by
the Supreme Court nor Congress have helped to stem the tide.
C. The Actions To Limit Private Actions In The 1990s
Despite the Supreme Court limiting the application of 1Ob-5 by rejecting
the "parity of information" theory" espoused by Dirk$, there were enough
theories around to allow for abounding private actions under the rule in the
1980s and 1990s. Consequently, by the middle of the last decade, there was
open concern at the S.E.C. and in Congress that abusive litigation was chilling
disclosure by corporate management."' Again, the tightrope analogy fits, as
analysts were dragged into the fray when their projections (based upon
company figures) missed the mark, or they could simply be linked to insiders
alleged to have profited from corporate misfortunes."'
Both the Congress and the federal bench took note that the securities laws
were being invoked frivolously. By mid-decade, there was hope that a 1994
Supreme Court ruling would eradicate aiding and abetting liability, thus
saving many types of professionals from being included in 1Ob-5 suits; alas,

109. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593.
110. See, testimony of Hon. Richard C. Breeden, former Chairman, S.E.C., before the Securities
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Apr. 6, 1995),
available at 1995 WL 155054 ("Shareholders are also damaged due to the chilling effect of the
current system on the robust and candor of disclosure .... Understanding a company's own
assessment of its future potential would be among the most valuable information shareholders and
potential investors could have about a firm.").
111. See, e.g., In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1054 (N.D. Cal. 1993); In re Cirrus Logic Sec.
Litig., 946 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See generally,Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d
156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980) (establishing the "entanglement theory" for evaluating relationships and

apportioning culpability between issuers and analysts).
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in hindsight, a broad allegation of "conspiracy" involving these individuals
12
often survives.
Specifically, in CentralBank,N.A. v. FirstInterstateBank, NA.,"13 it was
expressly held by the Supreme Court that there could be no civil liability for
damages for aiding and abetting a violation of Rule 1Ob-5. "4 The Court's
decision unequivocally concluded that"the text of the 1934 Act does not itself
reach those who aid and abet a §10(b) violation.""' However, while the
decision had an immediate and salubrious effect on the trustee bank that had
been joined in what was essentially a case of bad municipal bonds, it has
actually only posed minor obstacles for plaintiffs' attorneys drafting future
complaints against analysts.
After Central Bank, there are still suits in which secondary actors are
named, just in different terms. The label "abettor" has been seamlessly
replaced by "conspirator," and the courts have even expressly stated that the
plaintiff was not limited by Central Bank."6 In Cooper v. Pickett, two
analysts employed by firms underwriting the proposed stock offering by a
computer company were named as defendants in the plaintiffs class action
alleging a conspiracy to keep adverse corporate information from the public." 7
The suit specifically alleged violations of Sections lOb and 20(a) of the
Exchange Act." The complaint alleged that the defendants "falsely presented
the Company's current and future business prospects and prolonged the
illusion of revenue and earnings growth" through communications with
securities analysts who then repeated these representations in favorable
research reports." 9 Indeed, the complaint focused on conference calls
between management and the two analyst defendants.120 A district court had

112. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 625 (9th Cir. 1997) wherein both Merisel, Inc. company
officials and analysts with whom they communicated were sued ("Plaintiffs' claims therefore are not
barred by Central Bank in that they are asserting that Merisel, through false statements to analysts,
and those analysts, by issuing reports based on statements they knew were false, together engaged
in a scheme to defraud the shareholders,"). See also, Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("The court is not persuaded that a 'scheme to defraud' could not be
alleged which would be outside the scope of the 'aiding and abetting' activity discussed in Central
Bank.").
113. Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
114. Id.at 191.
115. Id. at 177.
116. See, e.g., Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616.
117. ld.at619-20.
118. Id.at 619. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes joint and several liability upon parties found
to have controlled persons who violate any provision of the act. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994).
119. Id. at 620.
120. Id.at 623.
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dismissed the complaint as to all defendants' but, on appeal, the 9' Circuit
reinstated the claims and rejected all of the defendants' arguments, including
the defense that aiding and abetting liability had been eradicated by Central
22
Bank.
Likewise, there was the hope that the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), 2 1with its heightened pleading standard, would help
to stem litigation against analysts, accountants, and other third parties.
However, the PSLRA arguably acted only to provide a road map on how to
successfully join analysts in a 1Ob-5 suit. Witness the court's words in
McNamarav. Bre-X Minerals, LTD.'24 in dismissing the claims against the
analysts without prejudice:
[T]he Plaintiffs failed to make the allegation regarding [the analyst's]
knowledge of the test results with sufficient particularity. The Plaintiffs do
not specify when and how [the analyst] learned of the test results .... The
Plaintiffs also allege that [the firm] learned there was no gold ... through a
visit [the analyst] made.... The Plaintiffs must allege in more detail to what
[the analyst] was made privy. What tests did [the analyst] observe Bre-X
perform and how did those tests depart so far from accepted practices that
[the analyst] knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the entire project
was a hoax?... How do the Plaintiffs know what [the analyst] saw and was
made privy to... ?"'
Thus, when it comes to limiting suits against professionals who are not
primary violators, the courts and the Congress have arguably been of little
help. Inevitably, the path that 1Ob-5 litigation follows, at least by default, is
going to be chosen by the Commission, as the private bar immediately
converts new duties into failed obligations. It seems odd, then, that the
Proposal and the Final Release, while ostensibly encouraging disclosure,
provide neither indication of the analyst's duties when confided in by
management nor even protection from allegations of having been a party to
improper disclosure. This total disregard by the Commission of the fate of the
analyst is hardly commensurate with the flattering appraisals ofanalysts inked
by the courts and the S.E.C. in the last thirty years.

121.
122.
123.
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125.

Id. at 621.
Id. at 624-25.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals, LTD., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396 (ED. Tex. 1999).
Id. at 420. Separately, the PSLRA also affirmed that, despite CentralBank, the S.E.C. retained the
authority to prosecute aiding and abetting violations. See, § 104, 109 Stat. at 757.

20001

Bouncing the Tightrope
III. PLACING A VALUE ON ANALYSTS

Curiously, it is the cases againstanalysts that seem to most lavishly praise
their worth. Thus, although pilloried at times for their alleged part in the
distribution of inside information, analysts are consistently supported, in
theory, by the S.E.C. and jurists alike. As the Bausch & Lomb court stated:
Analysts provide a needed service in culling and sifting available data,
viewing it in light of their own knowledge of a particular industry and
ultimately furnishing a distilled product in the form of reports. These
analyses can then be used by both the ordinary investor and by the
professional investment adviser as a basis for the decision to buy or sell a
given stock. The data available to the analyst - his raw material - comes in
part from published sources but must also come from communication with
management. Both the NYSE and the SEC have encouraged publicly traded
companies to maintain an "open door" policy toward securities analysts. 6
Indeed, the duty of the analyst in selective disclosure situations might
aptly be termed Herculean. Expected to create news but prohibited from
revealing secrets, the analyst is truly trapped in an oxymoronic duty. Witness
the daunting instruction in the landmark case of Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc., that the law permit a "skilled analyst with knowledge of a company and
the industry [to] piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public
information into a mosaic which reveals materialnon-public information.'
In the Final Release, the S.E.C. echoed this tribute to analysts' vaulted (if not
cryptic) task:
. ..an issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of
information to an analyst, even if,unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps
the analyst complete a "mosaic" of information that, taken together, is
material. Similarly, since materiality is an objective test keyed to the
reasonable investor, Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer
discloses immaterial information whose [sic] significance isdiscerned by the
analyst.'28
Legalistically, the analyst's task began to approach the insurmountable
when it was determined that she and the issuer need not personally make
money from trading to have nonetheless served as "tippee" and "tipper,"
respectively, in a IOb-5 chain of liability. This development was occasioned

126. S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
127. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
128. Final Release at 51,722.
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by the oft-understated theoretical expansion of the "benefit" of an issuer's
illegal "tip" through two federal cases. In Dirks, the Supreme Court, while
holding that there must exist a personal gain to the "tipper" to establish a
breach of fiduciary duty, held that such personal gain could even take the form
3 ' a district
of a "reputational benefit."'29 Subsequently, in S.E.C. v. Gaspar,"
court expanded this liberal notion of personal gain to include "any
reputational benefit," i.e., enhancing a professional relationship or even
bestowing a "gift." '' Indeed, it is now woven into the very fabric of 1Ob-5
caselaw that the "tipper" need not gain financially nor tangibly to be found to
have caused a violation.'32 In the aftermath of these two cases, merely acting
as an analyst consistently covering the same company would seem to supply
the requisite "benefit" to a "tipper" at a company for purposes of 1Ob-5
claims. Thus, the analyst, as part of his everyday job, could unwittingly be
fulfilling the dictates of the tipper-tippee equation.
With Friends Like These...
Despite this rough treatment, the analyst is consistently hailed by the
S.E.C. and others as a worthy check on a company's self interested
disclosure.' 33 As recently as May of this year, the Commission reminded
issuers whose securities are in registration to "maintain communications with
the public" including answering "unsolicited telephone inquiries concerning
business matters from securities analysts."' 34 Indeed, on one level, the
disinterested analyst serves to corroborate the disclosure made by a company
acting in good faith but fearing market suspicion. Wholly apart from these

129. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
130. S.E.C. v. Gaspar, No. 83 Civ. 3037, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20698 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1985)
(defendant analyst/securities salesman privy to a client's acquisition negotiations held to have
revealed confidential information to stock broker to enhance their "professional relationship" or
alternatively, bestow a "gift"). Id. at *42-45.
131. Id. at *43-44.
132. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997) (tipping found in the context of Rule 14e-3
liability); S.E.C. v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The close friendship between [tipper]
and [tippee] suggests that [tipper's] tip was 'intended to benefit' [tippee], and therefore allows ajury
finding that [tipper's] tip breached a duty under § 10(b).").
133. See, S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
134. S.E.C. Interpretation, Use of Electronic Media, Release Nos. 33-7856, 34-42728 (Rel. Apr. 28,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, and 271), available at
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-42788.htm>.
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"moral hazard" considerations raised by learned academics," it is the analyst
whose core function is to sift through puffery and root out the
inconsequential." 6 Ironically, it was the S.E.C. itself that urged this view

upon the courts, for it was the Commission that held, In the Matter of
RaymondL. Dirks, that "[t]he value to the entire market of [analysts'] efforts

cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly enhanced by
[their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and thus the analyst's
work redounds to the benefit of all investors.' 3 7
These random and arguably insincere platitudes resound through the
Proposal and the Final Release. 13s The S.E.C. reiterates that analysts serve a

screening function for technical financial information, even acknowledging
that "if it served an issuer's corporate interests to make disclosure of material
information to selected analysts . . . it could do so, provided that the
recipients" expressly agree to keep such information confidential.',

Additionally, the S.E.C. expressly avows that "benefits may flow to the

135. The "moral hazard" that issuers face and the utility of analysts in overcoming this hazard are well
described in the writings of Professor Langevoort. See, Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts
and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (1990) (stating that:
A third purpose served by informal contacts [with analysts], perhaps the most intriguing, is
that they operate to overcome a serious moral hazard problem in the process of corporate
disclosure. An issuer wishing to make public disclosure of positive information faces the
natural suspicion of the investing public: many previous issuers have lied about or otherwise
overstated their financial condition or future prospects. Because of this moral hazard a
company telling the truth must seek ways of bonding the accuracy of the information.).
136. See, Symposium, Insider Trading and Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v.
S.E.C., 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984) (stating that:
Analysts serve a monitoring function as well as providing a conduit for the
transmission of information. Because managers may disseminate false information
about the firm, or may attempt to conceal negative information, analysts have
incentives to engage in some search themselves before making recommendations to
their clients. This monitoring activity is a natural complement to the role of analysts
in communicating information about the firm to investors.).
137. In the Matter of Raymond L. Dirks, Release No. 17480, 1981 S.E.C. LEXIS 2213, at *18 (Jan. 22,
1981).
138. See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,722 (2000) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, and 249) ("Analysts can provide a valuable service in sifting
through and extracting information that would not be significant to the ordinary investor to reach
material conclusions.").
139. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,595 (1999) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230,240,243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999). The examples given by the S.E.C. for
such selective disclosure are for the purpose of having analysts "analyze complex information before
its public release, or to solicit analysts' views on a business strategy under consideration." Id See
also, Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading,35 STAN. L. REV.
857, 879 (1983) (-[T]he argument [concerning the delaying of disclosure of information] assumes
that all information can be disclosed. But information such as revisions of probabilities of future
states cannot necessarily be conveyed directly.").
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markets from the legitimate efforts of securities analysts" because of their
"superior diligence and acumen.' ' 40 The Proposal even heralded the
regulatory role of analysts who review issuers' reports pre-publication by
citing to S.E.C. v. Stevens, 4 ' a 1991 case in which the court specifically noted
that an analyst who had covered the company in issue "ceased his coverage
and publicly challenged" the financial figures released by the company's
CEO. 142 Yet, the S.E.C. simultaneously undermines this champion, clearly
stating, "Whereas issuers once may have had to rely on analysts to serve as
information intermediaries, issuers can 43now use a variety of methods to
communicate directly with the market.'1
Thus, the S.E.C. seems to be speaking out of both sides of its mouth.
Despite its continued celebration of analysts, the Proposal and the Final
Release, in spirit and in letter, strike a harsh balance against their continued
utility. Based upon a perception of widespread corporate favoritism that is
questioned by, among others, at least one former Commissioner," the analyst
has been demoted to but one source of information for the New Economy's
aggressively investing public. Such a demotion seems a high price to pay in
light of the Regulation FD's weaknesses, namely its vagaries, omissions, and
chilling threats.
IV. MISSING THE MARK?
To be sure, Regulation FD suffers from its undefined terms including
"materiality," "nonpublic," and "broad, non-exclusionary" public
disclosure. 14 For example, where does one draw the line between "recklessly
intentional" and "non-intentional" disclosures of material information? In a
larger sense, what is a non-intentional disclosure, and which unlucky issuer
would like to be the first to find out? What is a "publicly available credit

140. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592.
141. S.E.C. v. Stevens, Release No. 12813, No. 91 Civ. 1869, 1991 S.E.C. LEXIS 451 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
19, 1991). In that case, the CEO was charged with violations of§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
("1933 Act") and § 10b of the Exchange Act after placing a series of unsolicited telephone calls to
several analysts in which he gave details about his company's quarterly earnings. These analysts
then recommended that their clients sell the company's stock. The analysts to whom he so disclosed
were not charged. Id. at *2-3.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Final Release at 51,717.
144. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 17, at Cl (comments of former S.E.C. Commissioner Edward H.
Fleischman stating "I would question the assumption that there is widespread practice that gives rise
to this stain [as coined by Chairman Levitt]... that it is widespread, that I doubt.").
145. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594-95.
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rating," and why should the agency that prepares it be entitled to an exemption
1 46
that a fund with an audience of sixteen million investors does not enjoy?
Does an announcement on CNBC's popular "Conference Call" television
program constitute "public disclosure"? Does any television program (cable
or otherwise) by itself ensure broad disclosure as mandated by new Rule
101(e)? Indeed, there exist additional mixed signals on the means of public
disclosure throughout the Proposal. 47 As in prior S.E.C. releases concerning
adequacy of corporate communications in this technological era, the
Commission's message remains blurred, as both the Proposal and the Final
Release promote the Commission's own EDGAR disclosure system while at
times decrying the use of an Internet website as a universal medium.'48
Regarding the usefulness of analysts in general, S.E.C. support for
analysts, like the Cheshire cat's grin, conveniently appears and vanishes.
From a marketplace standpoint, this is a dangerous time for the S.E.C.'s grin
to disappear, for the choice has been made to loose raw corporate information
upon an investing public that, for the most part, has never seen a bear
49
market. 1

146. See, e.g., David Henry, Small Investorsto Get EqualAccess to Company Information, USA TODAY,
Aug. 10, 2000, at 3B, available in 2000 WL 5786372.
147. See, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,595-97.
148. See id. at 72,593, 72,597. The Commission apparently cannotdecide what weight is to be accorded
a company's website. The Proposal contradicts itself concerning the adequacy of mass
communications, stating that "[d]espite the rapid expansion ofIntemet access, a significant number
ofhouseholds do not have access. Moreover, simply putting information on a website does not alert
investors that it is available." Id. at 72,597 n.5 1. The Proposal also states that "[wle [the S.E.C.]
also have greater flexibility and improved technology for widespread dissemination of information.
The Commission's EDGAR system permits investors to access issuer information [through the
Internet] almost as soon as it is filed with us." Id. at 72,593 n.24. But critics have been quick to
note that it takes 24 hours for filings with the S.E.C. to appear on its website. See, Michael
Schroeder & Randall Smith, DisclosureRule ClearedBy the S.E.C., THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
Aug. 11, 2000, at Cl, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3039939. Finally, the Final Release
acknowledges that those issuer's "whose websites are widely followed" could utilize them in
conjunction with other methods in attempting to effectuate legal, broad disclosure. Final Release
at 51,724.
149. The S.E.C.'s smile upon analysts is apparently also dependent on the type of information to be
entrusted to the public: InJuly of this year, the S.E.C. proposed Rule 1lAcl-5, which would require
exchanges and other "market centers" to make available to the public monthly reports on execution
quality. The S.E.C. has expressly enlisted the help of analysts in acting as an intermediary of this
new, market information:
... the information will need to be summarized and analyzed before it is helpful to
investors in general. The Commission anticipates that independent analysts, consultants,
broker-dealers, the financial press, and other market centers will analyze this information
and produce summaries that respond to the needs of investors.
S.E.C. Release, Disclosureof OrderRouting & Execution Practices,No. 34-43084, Rel. July 28,
2000 (to
be codified
at 17 C.F.R.
pt.
240),
available
at
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The Proposal also treads on dangerous ground by unabashedly adopting
plaintiffs' civil actions, which contains a series of heretofore unpredictable
1Ob-5 standards at best. "0 The frightening aspect of this adoption is the augur
of yet more lOb-5 liabilities, for both the Proposal and the Final Release, by
filling in the gaps of S.E.C. regulation with private caselaw, end up indirectly
supporting its expansion and growth.
A. Setting Implied Actions To S.E.C. Music
The S.E.C. acknowledges that Regulation FD is designed to create duties
To meet the "broad, nonunder Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.'
exclusionary" requirement of public disclosure, the Final Release states that
issuers can "furnish or file" (i.e., follow Item 5 or 9 of Form 8-K) while
elsewhere, the Commission clarifies that the failure to make the newly
imposed Section 13 filing cannot form the basis for a Rule lOb-5 violation
(but can form the basis for a Section 13 violation).' An unsavory result of
these provisions is that an issuer might decide it is in its interest to forgo filing
and chance a Section 13 action rather than make an admission of having
disclosed material nonpublic information that invites scrutiny as to, among
other things, motive and the immediacy and thoroughness of redress. Stated
otherwise, given the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether material
information has been imparted, as well as the fact that courts are loath to
imply private actions from Section 13,153 an issuer mightjust risk the reporting
violation rather than make a filing, which serves as an admission that is
almost certain to invite 10b-5 class action claims.
Additionally, while affirming that failure to comply with Regulation FD
may lead to an S.E.C. Enforcement action,"s the Proposal distinguished that
the regulation did not create an implied civil remedy, and strangely, that it did
not create duties under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.' 5 However, the
S.E.C. certainly doth protest too much, for the Proposal concomitantly cited
to the Dirks "personal benefit" test 56 as well as two other private litigations
<http://www.see.gov/rules/proposed/34-43084.htm>.
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,594 n.36.
Id at 72,598.
Final Release at 51,723, 51,726.
See, In re Penn Cent. Sees. Litig., 357 F.Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd 494 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir.
1974).
154. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,598.
150.
151.
152.
153.

155. Id.
156. Id. (citing S.E.C. v. Stevens, Release No. 12813, No. 91 Civ. 1869, 1991 U.S. S.E.C. LEXIS 451
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1991)).
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addressing 1Ob-5 liability for inadequate disclosure." 7 Likewise, inthe Final
Release, the S.E.C. pointedly reminded issuers and others that selective
disclosure to analysts is not shielded from insider trading liability.ss
Moreover, elsewhere in the Final Release, the S.E.C. expressly repeated
that it had precluded 1Ob-5 violations based upon a failure tofle a Form 8K
but offered no similar lOb-5 protection for Forms 8-K that are filed.
Noteworthy is the fact that a filing under Regulation FD is an incontrovertible
admission by the issuer that it improperly disclosed information. If, as the
S.E.C. admits, the universally-dreaded "chilling effect" upon issuers is
directly related to their perceptions concerning private litigation, 5 9 then the
Commission's promise of no civil liability has already been discarded, as
issuers and their legal counsel have been quick to evidence a desire to simply
choke off relations with analysts altogether."re Clearly, the private sector is
not convinced thatthe S.E.C. has precluded class actions following Regulation
FD filings or violations. 6 '
Thus, we are concurrently being asked to accept that (1) the S.E.C. is not
creating lOb-5 duties; (2) there will be 1Ob-5 enforcement action following
a faulty compliance with the new Section 13 duties; and yet (3) the S.E.C. is
not encouraging private enforcement of the new obligations through civil
lOb-5 cases. In light of lOb-5 history, there is of course, plenty of evidence
that such a blank check will be cashed by the Commission and private litigants

157. Id. (citing Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (lst Cir. 1990); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980)). From the start, the S.E.C. has warned that any public disclosure made
under Regulation FD that contained false or misleading information, or omitted information, could
invoke enforcement action based upon § 10(b) or § 18 of the Exchange Act, while a flawed Form
8-K could trigger § II liability under the 1933 Act. Id.
158. Final Release at 51,716 n.7,
159. Seeid at51,726.
160. Within a week of the adoption of Regulation FD, the California law firm that serves as counsel to
Cisco Systems, Inc. and E* Trade Group, Inc. stated that it planned to advise clients "that if it isn't
too detrimental to relations with analysts and others, forgoing such conversations is the safest thing
to do." Jeff D. Opdyke & Aaron Luchetti, Mum's the Word in Wake ofDisclosure Rule, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 16,2000 at C l, available in 2000 WL-WSJ 3040340. Similarly, Atlanta's
475-lawyer firm of Alston & Bird L.L.P. has already warned clients that Regulation FD "makes it
more important than ever for public companies to limit the number of executives (perhaps even to
only one) who are authorized to speak to analysts and institutional investors." Todd R. David &
Kelly C. Wilcove, New S. E.C RegulationsAddress Selective Disclosure and Clarify Insider Trading
Standards, SECURITIES LAW ADVISORY,
Aug.
2000, available at
<http://www.alston.com/docs/advisories.htm>.
161. "If they [issuers] open up theiroffices and factories to analysts, there will likely be shrewd operators
who make money. If that happens, the information egalitarians at the S.E.C. may be offended and
start disciplinary actions. This will likely start private suits as well." Kevin A. Hassett, Outlaw
Selective Disclosure?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 10, 2000, at A 18, available in 2000 WLWSJ 3039742.
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It is axiomatic that there exists a plethora of litigation caused by

plaintiffs' previous attempts to set implied actions to S.E.C. music, even
without such clear prompting by the Commission. In this realm, the very
flexible standard by which such implied actions sound or are silenced often

speaks not to the S.E.C.'s wishes but rather to Congressional intent and "a
causal connection between the alleged fraud and the harm incurred" by the
purchase/sale of the security.""
It is worth reiterating that analysts have been sued for civil I Ob-5 liability
(even post-Dirks) where it is not clear what tangible benefit accrued to their

tipper.'" Thus, although the Commission states that it is not the intention to
create implied causes of action against those who violate Regulation FD, this
sentiment is not dispositive. Indeed, it has been held that the two-prong test
for discerning whether a private action exists under I Ob-5 focuses on broader
issues, namely: (1) whether the statute underlying the S.E.C. rule permits an
implied cause of action' 65 and (2) whether a private right of action under the
statute should be implied from the agency rule at issue."6 Noticeably absent
from this two-prong test is the intent of the S.E.C. to include/preclude private
rights of action at the time of the adoption of a particular rule. 7

162. See, Baxter v. A.R. Baron & Co., No. 94 Civ. 3913, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15098, at *29-30
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1996) (private 1Ob-5 action based in part on an issuer's failure to file a Form
8-K; court dismissed claim because plaintiff failed to plead reliance); In re American Continental
Corp./Lincoln S&L Sec. Litig., 794 F.Supp. 1424, 1446 (D.Ariz. 1992) (motion for summary
judgment denied where 10b-5 claims premised in part upon accounting firm's agreeing with
statements in issuer's Form 8-K).
163. Arst v. Stifel, Nicolaus &Co., 86 F.3d 973,977 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding an implied cause of action
under S.E.C. Rule 10b-16, which sets forth the disclosure duties of broker-dealers regarding credit
terms in margin transactions).
164. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 576 F.Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (held that,
although it was "unclear" how selective disclosures to the tippee analysts would increase the stock's
price, that issue would be "placed before the jury").
165. Of course, implied rights ofaction under 10b-5 have existed forover 50 years and have been blessed
by the Supreme Court for close to 30 years. See, Kardon v.National Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971)
(court acknowledged that it was "established" that a private action under 10b-5 existed). Separately,
private rights of action under the securities laws have been described by the Supreme Court as a
"judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v.Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
166. See, Kardon, 69 F.Supp. at 514; Superintendent of Ins., 404 U.S. at 13 n.9; Blue Chip Stamps, 421
U.S. at 737.
167. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939,948 (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
935 (1985). See also, Metzner v. D.H. Blair & Co., 689 F.Supp 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(referencing the "excellent analysis" present inAngelastro);Greenblatt v. Drexel Bumham Lambert,
Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1985); Robertson v. Dean Witer Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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Logically, few parties would agree that more 1Ob-5 caselaw is the answer.
The only thing that the circus of Rule 1Ob-5 interpretations of selective
disclosure has made clear to date is that the fates of issuer and analyst are
hopelessly intertwined. An analyst will be liable as a "tipper" to his clients
only if he recommends trades after information "tipped" to him by the issuer
turns out to have been material and nonpublic.'68 Likewise, the issuer can
only be found liable as "tipper" if the "tippee" analysts (or further "tippees")
actually trade. 69 Yet, neither has been given much guidance from the S.E.C.
as to when illegal information has passed between them, leaving both groups
vulnerable to exponentially growing lawsuits under any extended applications
of 1Ob-5. Ironically, the Final Release, while attempting to disconnect issuers
allegedly linked to their favorite analysts, has once again hopelessly
intertwined their fates: Issuers are obliged to recognize "circumstances in
which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will purchase or sell the
issuer's securities on the basis of the information," 7 while the disciplinary
fate of all securities market professionals to whom information is disclosed is
dependent totally upon whetherthe issuer (a) has imparted material non-public
information and (b) done nothing to remedy the situation through immediate
or prompt public disclosure.
Thus, while the goal of a completely level playing field is perhaps
laudatory, in the puzzle of corporate disclosure, an even more active securities
fraud docket is a poor substitute for the missing piece. To be sure, litigation
has not exactly prompted issuers into open communications with the public
to date. In the Regulation FD debate, corporate management was quick to
realize that lawsuits would result from further imposition of duties without
definition of key terms, prompting one Silicon Valley executive to utter,
"In
7
a broad sense, almost any comment could be considered material."' '
B. A Suggestion
If the Commission is wedded to the route of adopting existing caselaw,
surely the vast terrain of court decisions provides an ample framework for a
laundry list of "do's" and "don'ts" for issuers and analysts. Apart from the
concept of fundamental fairness, such a focus on materialityhas the added
168. Elkind v. & Liggett & Myers, inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
169. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 353 F.Supp. 264,278 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 243. 100(b)(1)(v) (1999) (Regulation FD's "Rule 100(bXi)(iv)").
171. See, Matt Marshall, SecuritiesFirmsDebate Wider DisclosureofInformation, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 1, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 14922534 (emphasis added).
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benefit of providing concrete guidelines for both the issuer and the analyst, for
the would-be "tipper" as well as the purported "tippee." This task has at least
been flirted with at the Commission, as evidenced by the Proposal's references
to, and reliance upon, civil cases like Stevens and Liggett & Myers, " and by
the Final Release's inclusion of several examples of materialevents."'
The judiciary has already lent a hand to the task of outlining proper
behavior. For example, the courts have supported the recording and
transcribing of conference calls with analysts by ruling resulting transcripts
admissibe. 74 The courts (and the S.E.C.) have previously advised reporting
companies not to share internal projections. 7 The courts have, without much
issue, decreed that the failure to disclose forecasts is not actionable 76 and that
predictions in and of themselves cannot be actionable."'
Additionally, the courts have agreed that the federal securities laws "do
not ordain that the issuer of a security compare itself in myriad ways to its
competitors, whether favorably or unfavorably.' 7' Also, there seems to be no
duty to disclose information about the industry, which is already "well
understood"' 79 or where the market has knowledge because of information on
file with the S.E.C." 0 Simply put, since the Commission has stamped its
imprimatur on Basic v. Levinson, TSC Indus. v. Northway, and Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, then why not adopt the other cases mentioned above as well?
The Commission admits: "We recognize that materiality judgments can
be difficult. Corporate officials may therefore become more cautious in
communicating with analysts or selected investors. ... ""' Regrettably, a full
list of materialitems is not the road chosen by the S.E.C. at this time. Instead,
within the context of incomplete caselaw, Regulation FD appears to represent

172. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,598 (1999) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
173. See, note 59, supra, and accompanying text.
174. See, Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc., 2 F.Supp.2d 1231 (ND. Cal. 1998); Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616
(9th Cir. 1997).
175. See, Cooper, 137 F.3d 616.
176. In re VeriFone Sec. Litig., II F.3d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1993).
177. Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 173 (5th Cir. 1994). See also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 552 cmt. h. (1977).
178. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting In re Donald J.
Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 375 (3d Cir. 1993)).
179. In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943
(1990); In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 1991).
180. Picard Chem., Inc. Profit Sharing v. Perrigo Co., 940 F.Supp. 1101, 1123 (W.D. Mich. 1996).
181. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,594 (1999) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, and 249) (proposed Dec. 20, 1999).
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an in terrorem attempt to pose new obligations and concomitant penalties for
indifference thereto.
For those who argue that the mosaic that the S.E.C. is slowly piecing best
serves to deter fraud, there is greater evidence of uninformed investors and
chilled management. Witness the havoc wreaked last fall when management
at the Maytag company, as their stock dropped on a Wednesday and an
additional 25 %on Thursday, simply spoke to neither analysts nor the public
until a press release disclosing lowered estimates could be prepared for Friday
morning.' 2 Maytag stock fell again after the Friday press release, a loss
occasioned by the company's failure to deliver the bad news in a timely
manner, according to one analyst."'
Likewise, a lack of definition of the operative terms works to anger the
professional and the laymen alike. The Proposal cites to an article in The
Washington Post, which detailed Hewlett-Packard's late disclosure of the
effect of order disruptions overseas on company earnings estimates in 1999."'
Although the point the Commission attempts to make is that a large issuer
seemingly disclosed to a few what should have been told to the many, the
article actually illustrates how, even in hindsight, obligations are inextricably
linked with definitions. 85
The details are as follows. In a conference call with analysts on October
Vt%the company disclosed that among its concerns was the fear of a possible
disruption of foreign component flow. 6 Hewlett-Packard posted the
transcript of this conference call on its website.'87 About three weeks later,
the company answered the queries of particular analysts in a slightly more
negative tone, openly acknowledging that some component flow was being
disrupted.'"8 Apparently, this information was not broadly disseminated." 9
A Merrill Lynch analyst dropped his earnings estimate for the company by a
nickel.'" Other analysts followed suit and the stock had dropped twelve

182. David Barboza, Maytag'sLag In DisclosureCosts It Dearly, THENEW YORK TiMEs, Sept. 15, 1999,
at CI, available at 1999 WL 30481820 ("Analysts, accustomed to gentle guidance from all manner
of companies, were shocked and angry.").
183. Id. (comment of Nicholas Heymann of Prudential Securities, Inc.).
184. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,592.
185. Fred Barbash, Companies, Analysts A Little Too Cozy, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at
HI, available at 1999 WL 23312326.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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points before the company issued a press release on October 28' disclosing
earthquake-related problems in Taiwan. 9 '
Angry investors flooded Internet chat rooms with invective centering on
the company's seemingly late disclosure of information. 92 But the scenario
serves only to heighten the confusion over allocation of blame. Was this
materialinformation? In hindsight, yes, but perhaps only because the analysts
thought so. Stated otherwise, did the analysts' lower estimates between
October 1St and October 28"' 9 result from, or actually cause, the bulk of the
decline? Should the company have issued its press release sooner? Perhaps.
But it presumably either did or did not know about an earthquake in Taiwan
at the time of its posting of the initial conference call transcript on its
website. 9
More importantly, didn't the analysts here do their jobs by asking
questions of management, by "ferreting" out information? Simply put, the
what that issuers must impart must be determined before the S.E.C. judges
when and how it is "broadly disseminated."' 95
CONCLUSION
The S.E.C. has greatly discounted the role of the analyst in favor of
curtailing perceived corporate favoritism. The vehicle for this change is
Regulation FD, a rule that, while surely a crowd-pleaser, upon closer scrutiny,
fails to pass muster. For despite the S.E.C.'s conclusory statement that the
dividing line between proper and improper information to be disclosed is
"reasonably clear,"'" it is not. Despite the homage paid everyday to
disclosure of corporate information,"" it remains a dangerous enterprise. In
sum, in insider trading cases, neither the issuer nor the analyst has received
much guidance from the S.E.C., nor hope of speedy dismissal from suit by the
courts. To the contrary, analysts have arguably borne an inordinate amount

Id.
Id. ("It is particularly frustrating to sit by in ignorance during a sell-off," wrote one investor.).
Id
Id.
See, Selective Disclosure and InsiderTrading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,605 n. 117. See also, Final Release
at 51,724.
196. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,595.
197. See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156,165 (2d Cir. 1980). See also, NYSE Listed
Company Manual, § 202.05 ("Timely Disclosure of Material News Developments"), available at
<http://www.NYSE.com./listed/listed.htm>.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

2000]

Bouncing the Tightrope

of culpability in the eyes of the Commission, whose aggressive allegations
in
'9
this area were once dismissed by a federal court as a "facile inference."I s
Moreover, the Proposal and the Final Release, which are both premised
upon sketchy models that lump together all size issuers and analysts, do little
to enhance the existing prohibition, e.g., that "the duty imposed on a company
and its officers is an alternative one: they must disclose material inside
information either to no outsiders or to all outsiders equally."', While
Regulation FD has been cheered even by some analysts who believe that it
will lead issuers to choose audiences more democratically," °° the regulation,
with its repetitive emphasis on the penalties for engaging in a practice that
"bears a close resemblance ... to ordinary 'tipping' and insider trading," ''
may signal a return to the dark days ofthe 1970s for analysts, when the S.E.C.
charged them seemingly for being party to ill-advised comments or for simply
being a link in a chain of events surrounding an alleged insider trading
scheme.0 2
Although in spirit an admirable effort, Regulation FD poses new threats
and avoids the issue: What can and cannot be said to an analyst? As was said
in Bausch & Lomb and that remains true today, "[t]he permissible scope of
corporate communications with security analysts has yet to be authoritatively
defined.""0 3 Further, the Regulation fails to even provide for the analyst, the
same sanctuary of public disclosure remedies afforded the issuer.2 "
Surely, a more worthy effort would be to continue the perhaps arduous
process of listing what can and cannot be disclosed. Then, if legal confusion,
conspiracy theories, and abounding class actions persist, at least they will do
so in the name of progress. Right now, the purported improvement most
readily endangers the analysts, the professionals to whom, for better or worse,
we have entrusted our system of disclosure. "Instead of worrying about
someone having an 'unfair' advantage in the stock market, we should applaud
any incentives that lead others to do our information processing for us,"

198. S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 1977).
199. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d at 165 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)).
200. Lynn Hume, Insider Trading FearsMay Be Exaggerated,S.E.C. Member Says, THE BOND BUYER,
Feb. 17,2000, at 32 ("Ironically, analysts have also applauded the rules, saying they suggest issuers
will not get into trouble for talking to analysts as long as they disclose information publicly.").
201. Final Release at 51,716.
202. See generally, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,593.
203. S.E.C. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F.Supp. 1226, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
204. Specifically, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(eX2) ("Rule 101(cX2)").
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recently penned a Wall Street Journal columnist."' As Professor Homer
Kripke presaged over twenty-five years ago, "[t]hose who try to use disclosure
rationally are going to use professional help in doing so anyway.""
Nearly every Internet access provider now offers some form of free stock
market advice. At a time when the Web is luring the uninitiated to the front
lines of investing and consequentially, new types of fraud are growing, 27 do
we really want to thin out the ranks of analysts? Probably not. In this
persistently undefined area and this new and confusing technological era,
while issuers and analysts struggle to find a balance, let us not bounce the
tightrope by adding only sanctions, penalties, and fear.
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conference on its measure to end selective disclosure was itself only selectively disclosed (to the
media).

See, Media Advisory on Proposed Selective Disclosure Rule,

reprinted at

<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2000-11 0.txt> (visited Aug. 9,2000) (reminding the public that
the press conference was for "credentialed media only").
206. Homer Kripke, The Myth of the InformedLayman, 28 Bus. LAW. 631, 637 (1973).

207. See, Marcy Gordon, S.E.C. is Creating a System To Search the Web for Fraud: Major Accounting
Firm Opposes the System, Saying It Violates Privacy,ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 29,2000, at

Cl, available in 2000 WL 3516781. See also, S.E.C. Files Civil Fraud Charges Against Online
Stockpicker, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 6, 2000, at Al, available in 2000 WL 21236973
(describing the charges filed against "Tokyo Joe," an online analyst alleged to have, among other
things, accepted cash from an issuer inreturn for a favorable recommendation and repeatedly advised
his readers on stocks inwhich he had undisclosed positions).
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APPENDIX 1
(Regulation FD)

§ 243.100 General rule regarding selective disclosure.
(a) Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf, discloses any
material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its securities to
any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall
make public disclosure of that information as provided in § 243.10 1(e):
(1) Simultaneously, in the case of an intentional disclosure; and
(2)
(b)(1)

Promptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, paragraph
(a) of this section shall apply to a disclosure made to any person
outside the issuer:

(i) Who is a broker or dealer, or a person associated with a broker or
dealer, as those terms are defined in Section 3(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934;
(ii)

Who is: (A) an investment adviser, as that term is defined in
Section 202(a)(1 1) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; (B)
an institutional investment manager, as that term is defined in
Section 13(0(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that
filed a report on Form 13F with the Commission for the most
recent quarter ended prior to the date of the disclosure; or (C) a
person associated with either of the foregoing. For purposes of
this paragraph, a "person associated with an investment adviser
or institutional investment manager" has the meaning set forth
in Section 202(a)(17) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
assuming for these purposes that an institutional investment
manager is an investment adviser;
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(iii)

Who is an investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, or who would be an
investment company but for Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7)
thereof, or an affiliated person of either of the foregoing. For
purposes of this paragraph, "affiliated person" means only
those persons described in Section 2(a)(3)(C), (D), (E), and (F)
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, assuming for these
purposes that a person who would be an investment company
but for Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 is an investment company; or

(iv)

Who is a holder of the issuer's securities, under circumstances
in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will
purchase or sell the issuer's securities on the basis of the
information.

(2)

Paragraph (a) of this section shall not apply to a disclosure made:
(i) To a person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer
(such as an attorney, investment banker, or accountant);
(ii)

To a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed
information in confidence;

(iii)

To an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit
ratings, provided the information is disclosed solely for the
purpose of developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are
publicly available; or

(iv)

In connection with a securities offering registered under the
Securities Act, other than an offering of the type described in
any of Rule 415(a)(1)(i) - (vi) (§ 230.415(a)(1)(i) - (vi) of this
chapter).

§243.101 Definitions.
This section defines certain terms as used in Regulation FD (§§ 243.100 243.103).
(a) Intentional. A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is
"intentional" when the person making the disclosure either knows, or is
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reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is
communicating is both material and nonpublic.
(b)

Issuer. An "issuer" subject to this regulation is one that has a class
of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, or is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)), including any
closed-end investment company (as defined in Section 5(a)(2) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940) (15 U.S.C. 80a-5(a)(2)), but
not including any other investment company or any foreign
government or foreign private issuer, as those terms are defined in
Rule 405 under the Securities Act (§ 230.405 of this chapter).

(c) Person acting on behalf of an issuer. "Person acting on behalf of an
issuer" means any senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a
closed-end investment company, a senior official of the issuer's
investment adviser), or any other officer, employee, or agent of an
issuer who regularly communicates with any person described in §
243.100(b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii), or with holders of the issuer's securities.
An officer, director, employee, or agent of an issuer who discloses
material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence to the issuer shall not be considered to be acting on behalf
of the issuer.
(d)

Promptly. "Promptly" means as soon as reasonably practicable (but
in no event after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the
next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange) after a senior
official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end investment
company, a senior official of the issuer's investment adviser) learns
that there has been a
non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on behalf of
the issuer of information that the senior official knows, or is reckless in
not knowing, is both material and nonpublic.

(e) Public disclosure.
(1)

Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, an issuer
shall make the "public disclosure" of information required by §
243.100(a) by furnishing to or filing with the Commission a
Form 8-K (17 C.F.R. 249.308) disclosing that information.
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An issuer shall be exempt from the requirement to furnish or
file a Form 8-K if it instead disseminates the information
through another method (or combination of methods) of
disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad,
non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.

(2)

(f) Senior official. "Senior official" means any director, executive officer
(as defined in § 240.3b-7 of this chapter), investor relations or public
relations officer, or other person with similar functions.
(g)

Securities offering. For purposes of § 243.1 00(b)(2)(iv):
(1)

Underwritten offerings. A securities offering that is
underwritten commences when the issuer reaches an
understanding with the broker-dealer that is to act as managing
underwriter and continues until the later of the end of the
period during which a dealer must deliver a prospectus or the
sale of the securities (unless the offering is sooner terminated);

(2)

Non-underwritten offerings. A securities offering that is not
underwritten:
(i) If covered by Rule 415(a)(1)(x) (§ 230.415(a)(1)(x) of this
chapter), commences when the issuer makes its first bona fide
offer in a takedown of securities and continues until the later of
the end of the period during which each dealer must deliver a
prospectus or the sale of the securities in that takedown (unless
the takedown is sooner terminated);
(ii) If a business combination as defined in Rule 165(0(1) (§
230.165(f)(1) of this chapter), commences when the first public
announcement of the transaction is made and continues until
the completion of the vote or the expiration of the tender offer,
as applicable (unless the transaction is sooner terminated);
(iii)

If an offering other than those specified in paragraphs (a)
and (b)of this section, commences when the issuer files a
registration statement and continues until the later of the
end of the period during which each dealer must deliver a
prospectus or the sale of the securities (unless the offering
is sooner terminated).
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§ 243.102 No effect on antifraud liability.
No failure to make a public disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall be
deemed to be a violation of Rule 1Ob-5 (17 C.F.R. 240.1Ob-5) under the
Securities Exchange Act.
§243.103 No effect on Exchange Act reporting status.
A failure to make a public disclosure required solely by § 243.100 shall not
affect whether:
(a) For purposes of Forms S-2, 5-3, and S-8 under the Securities Act,
an issuer is deemed to have filed all the material required to be
filed pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act or, where applicable, has made those filings in a timely
manner; or
(b)

There is adequate current public information about the issuer
for purposes of Rule 144(c)) under the Securities Act.
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APPENDIX 2
(Rule 10b5-1 (in relevant part))
§ 240.10b5-1 Trading "on the basis of" material nonpublic information in
insider trading cases.
Preliminary Note to &240.1 ObS- 1: This provision defines when a purchase or
sale constitutes trading "on the basis of" material nonpublic information in
insider trading cases brought under Section 10(b) of the Act and Rule IOb-5
thereunder. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial
opinions construing Rule 1Ob-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope
of
insider trading law in any other respect.
(a) General. The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section
10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and §240.10b-5 thereunder include,
among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the
basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in
breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or
derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that
issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic
information.
(b)

Definition of"on the basis of." Subject to the affirmative defenses in
paragraph (c) of this section, a purchase or sale of a security of an
issuer is "on the basis of" material nonpublic information about that
security or issuer if the person making the purchase or sale was aware
of the material nonpublic information when the person made the
purchase or sale.

